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In a tournament competitors may cheat to gain an advantage. This paper considers the problem of
deterrence and finds that tournaments reflect special circumstances that are not present in a
traditional model of law enforcement. The traditional model considers sanctions and monitoring as
the instruments of deterrence. In a tournament the prize structure plays a critical role in determining
both the costs and benefits to cheating. We consider ways in which the prize structure can be
manipulated in order to reduce monitoring costs. .
“We didn’t get beat, we got out-milligrammed. And when you found out what they were
taking, you started taking them.” – Tom House (former MLB pitcher) in USA Today
1. INTRODUCTION
The idea that deterrence is a primary function of punishment dates back to
the 18th century (Beccaria, 1767; Bentham, 1789). The idea that the economic
theory of behavior can be used to analyze the deterrent effect of laws and
punishments dates back to the mid-20th century. Formal models developed
by economists such as Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1972), and Polinsky and
Shavell (2000) consider two instruments for deterrence: a monitoring
technology that generates a probability of detection, and a sanction.
Individuals are assumed to make decisions about criminal activities by
comparing expected benefits to expected costs. These costs and benefits
often depend on other aspects of the economy such as the distribution of
wealth (Ehrlich, 1973), levels of education (Ehrlich, 1975) and the presence of
increasing returns to crime.1 This paper demonstrates that the prize structure
of tournaments has important implications for deterrence.
Tournaments are a commonly used mechanism for the allocation of
resources. Examples include promotion tournaments, sporting events, patent
races, elections, and the classroom. Rank-order tournaments have many
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desirable features, particularly in the work place (see, for example, Bognanno,
2001; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999; Choi and Gulati, 2004). In a
tournament, however, competitors may have incentive to engage in activities
subverting the goals of the tournament organizer to gain an advantage. In
promotion tournaments, workers may falsify their books through “creative
accounting” (see Prendergast, 1999; Jacob and Levitt, 2003); athletes may take
steroids;2 politicians running for office may “stuff the ballot box”; and
students may bring “cheat sheets” to exams or commit plagiarism. Recently,
scandals in tournament environments have made headlines, from steroid use
in baseball, international cycling and the US Olympic track team to U.S. Rep.
Tom DeLay’s indictment for conspiracy to violate election laws in 2002.
Within the deterrence literature it has been noted that if sanctions are
costless and monitoring is not, then optimal deterrence entails setting the
sanction arbitrarily high and the probability of detection arbitrarily low.3
However, if there is a maximum penalty that can be imposed, the second
best alternative requires trading off the costs of monitoring against the costs
of suboptimal deterrence. In a tournament limited liability adds an additional
dimension. When tournament organizers can only strip cheaters of their prize
(as is often the case), the expected costs and benefits to cheating depend on
other individuals’ decisions to cheat.
The full effect of this interaction depends in part on whether an individual
finishing second receives the first place prize after the winner is found to
have cheated. We call this re-awarding. If prizes are not re-awarded, then
cheating behaviors are strategic complements, which may lead to the
co-existence of cheating and honest equilibria. If prizes are re-awarded, then
agents’ decisions to cheat may become strategic substitutes. In fact, many
tournaments do re-award prizes, one example being the Olympics.4 While
re-awarding prizes may appear to be costly, it can be optimal because it
reduces enforcement costs. Monitoring winners and losers differently and the
awarding of prizes for runners-up also have such benefits.
Early in the tournament literature, it was noted that competitors have
incentive to sabotage others. However, the approach was to consider
incentives for sabotage as a function of the tournament design without
considering monitoring and punishment (see, for example, Lazear, 1989;
Konrad, 2000, 2005; Chen, 2003; Epstein and Hefeker, 2003). Later papers
considered enforcement in their analysis (see Berentsen, 2002; Haugen, 2004;
Kräkel, 2006; Gilpatric, 2009; Gilpatric and Stowe, 2007), but not as a main focus.
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the effect of the prize structure
on the costs of deterrence.
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2. THE MODEL
We consider the following model of a rank-order tournament. Two risk
neutral contestants, 1 and 2, compete for a first place prize, A. We allow for a
second place prize, B, that may be greater than zero. The probability that
contestant i wins the tournament is partially determined by the effort exerted
by each of the competitors, e1 and e2, respectively. In addition, there exists
another activity, , that can increase a player’s chance of winning. Activity 
is for some reason undesirable5 and so shall be referred to as “cheating.”
This activity is assumed to be a binary decision so that a competitor either
cheats or does not, there is no question as to how much to cheat.
The probability that 1 wins the tournament is given by Pe1,e2,1,2,
where  i is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when i cheats and 0
when he/she does not. Thus P :2  0,12 → 0,1. We assume that the
tournament is symmetric so that Pe,e ′;, ′  1 − Pe ′,e; ′, for all
e,e ′,, ′, although the relaxation of this assumption is discussed in Section
5. Let P1  0 and P2  0 denote the marginal effects of the efforts of 1
and 2, respectively. Cheating increases the probability of winning for the
cheater, so that Pe1,e2; 1,2  Pe1,e2; 0,2 and Pe1,e2;1, 0 
Pe1,e2;1, 1. Finally, it is assumed that effort comes at a cost of ce
where c ′  0 and c ′′ ≥ 0, and that cheating is costless (aside from any
potential penalty).
This paper focuses on the costs associated with the deterrence of cheating
and is agnostic with regards to the determination of the activities that are
considered cheating and to their social costs. It is assumed that the
participants can be monitored to detect any cheating. Denote by  the
probability that an agent who cheats is caught. We assume limited liability on
behalf of the contestants so that the maximum penalty is the removal of the
prize.6 If the winner is found to have cheated, the other contestant may be
awarded the first-place prize instead (provided that person was not found to
have cheated). We call this “re-awarding.” We consider randomization over
whether such re-awarding takes place. This allows us to consider the effects
of re-awarding in a more general framework. Let  denote the probability
that the loser of the tournament is awarded the first place prize when the
winner is caught cheating.
The timing is as follows. First, the prize structure, the probability of
detection, and the probability of re-awarding are announced. Players decide
their effort and whether to cheat simultaneously. A winner is determined,
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prizes awarded and the organizer audits the players for cheating. If cheaters
are detected, then the penalty is imposed. In the analysis that follows, we
focus on the minimal levels of monitoring required to induce an unique
equilibrium in which neither contestant cheats, which we call an honest
equilibrium. This stems in part from the desire to remain agnostic about the
social costs of cheating as well as issues of equilibrium selection.
2.1. HONEST EQUILIBRIUM
We begin by considering the conditions for an honest equilibrium. To begin
with, it must be the case that each contestant is choosing a level of effort that
is a best response to the other’s choice, given that neither are cheating. In
other words, effort choices must solve
maxe1 B  Pe1,e2, 0, 0A − B − ce1
maxe2 A − Pe1,e2, 0, 0A − B − ce2
The corresponding first order conditions are
P1e1,e2, 0, 0A − B − c ′e1  0
− P2e1,e2, 0, 0A − B − c ′e2  0
In a symmetric equilibrium, each player exerts effort eH which is
characterized by the equation7
P1eH,eH, 0, 0A − B  c ′eH.
In an honest equilibrium, each contestant has a probability of winning
equal to 12 and an expected payoff of EUH  AB
̂
2 − ceH.
In order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be that neither contestant
prefers instead to cheat. Since the game is symmetric, we focus on player 1 in
the following analysis, but the same reasoning can be extended to the other
contestant. The payoff associated with deviating from this strategy8 is given
by
max
e1
1 − B  Pe1,eH, 1, 0A − B − ce1.
Denote by ê the level of effort that solves this maximization problem and let
EU be the expected utility from deviating from an honest equilibrium. We
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therefore have that participant 1 prefers not to cheat if and only if
1 − B  Pê,eH, 1, 0A − B − cê ≤ AB2 − ceH.   (2.1)
̂Note that when   0, then ÊU  EU
H. Similarly, when   1 we have that
EU  EUH. Further, EUH is independent of  while ÊU is strictly decreasing
in . Denote the minimal level of monitoring required to induce such an
equilibrium by H. It is worth mentioning that H is independent of . This
is because re-awarding only has an effect on an individual’s decision when
the other contestant cheats. Since H concerns an individual’s incentives to
cheat given that the other is not, the issue of re-awarding has no bearing.
Rearranging equation 2.1 and letting it hold with equality gives the following
characterization of H
H AB2  1 − HA − B  ceH − cê,   (2.2)
where   Pê,eH, 1, 0 − 12 is the change in probability of winning the
tournament associated with cheating (when the other contestant is not). Note
that it is possible for   0. This occurs when an agent reduces his effort
when cheating by more than enough to offset the increased chance of
winning arising from cheating. In such cases, contestants would cheat not to
have a better shot at winning, but to save on effort costs.
2.2. CHEATING EQUILIBRIUM
We now consider an equilibrium in which both contestants cheat. In such an
equilibrium, each player’s effort must be a best response to the others given
that they are both cheating. Note that limited liability means that if a
contestant is caught, her payoff is zero.
maxe 1 1 − B    1 − Pe1,e2, 1, 1A − B − ce1
maxe2 1 − B    1 − 1 − Pe1,e2, 1, 1A − B − ce2
The first order conditions are
1 − 1 − P1e1,e2, 1, 1A − B − c ′e1  0
− 1 − 1 − P2e1,e2, 1, 1A − B − c ′e2  0
In a symmetric equilibrium, denote the optimal effort by eC, which is
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EUC  1 −  1  A  1 − B2 − ce
C.
There exists an equilibrium in which both competitors cheat as long as
neither has incentive to deviate and not cheat. The payoff associated with
this type of deviation is given by
maxe1 B    1 − Pe1,eC, 0, 1A − B − ce1.
Denote by ẽ the level of effort that solves this maximization problem and let
ẼU be the associated payoff. Note that player 1 prefers to deviate9 if and
only if ẼU ≥ EUC. Recall that EUC is a function of the probability of being
detected, . Let C be the smallest  such that the player prefers not to cheat
(meaning that ẼUEUC). Rearranging the expressions for these two terms
yields
C A  B2  A − B  cẽ − ceC,     (2.3)
where   12 − Pẽ,eC, 0, 1 is the reduction in the probability of winning
associated with being honest when the other contestant is cheating. As
before, it is possible for   0. This occurs when a contestant increases her
effort enough when deviating to overcome the disadvantage caused by the
other’s cheating. Note that eC, ẽ and C are all functions of . The effect of 
on C is of particular interest and will be examined in section 2.4.
2.3. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Whenever H  C, there exists a range of monitoring,  ∈ H,C , such
that honest and cheating equilibria co-exist. Before considering the existence
of multiple equilibria formally, it should be noted that there are two potential
types of benefits one derives from cheating. The first is the increase in the
probability of winning directly due to cheating. For comparable levels of
effort, cheating gives an edge. However, cheaters also reduce their effort, and
so it is possible for the probability of coming in first to fall once adjusting for
the change in effort.10 Whenever the probability of winning the tournament
increases with cheating (after allowing for effort to adjust), a particular form
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characterized by
1  −1  −P1eC,eC, 1, 1A − B  c ′eC. 
and the equilibrium payoff is
of externality is present. When one contestant cheats, it reduces the expected
prize for the other, and by doing so reduces the expected penalty associated
with cheating for this second contestant. Thus, the benefit of cheating is not
independent of the decision of the other player. Thus cheating decisions are
strategic complements, and multiple equilibria exist for some levels of
monitoring.
Let us first consider the case where prizes are not re-awarded, i.e.   0.
There exist multiple equilibria, if at H, EUC  ẼU. Combining equations 2.2
and 2.3, this occurs when
 − 1 − HA − B  ceH − cê  ceC − cẽ.    (2.4)
Proposition 1 (Existence of Multiple Equilibria):When 0, there exist functions
Pe1,e2,1,2 and ce such that multiple equilibria exist for some values of .
The demonstration of examples of functions that lead to the existence of
multiple equilibria is sufficient to prove this proposition. Two common
forms of tournaments are the Lazear-Rosen and Tullock tournaments.
Example 1 (Lazear-Rosen): Let Pe1,e2,1,2  e1 − e2  1 − 2 ,
where  is a positive constant.11
In this case, it is easily verifiable that eH  ẽ and eC  ê. Thus the right hand
side to equation 2.4 is zero. It is also easily shown that     0 and so the
left hand side is positive, generating multiple equilibria. Note that in this case,
the marginal return to effort only depends on whether the contestant is
cheating or not. When a player cheats, there is a chance that she will be
caught, meaning that her effort has been wasted. Lazear-Rosen tournaments
with curvature in the success function also generate multiple equilibria as
long as the marginal return to effort does not decrease too much when an
individual cheats. 
Example 2 (Tullock): Let Pe1,e2,1,2  11 e111 e112 e2 and ce  e.
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While closed form solutions exist for effort levels (and therefore expected 
utilities), the expression for C is rather unwieldy. So consider the case where 
A  2, B  1 and   3. In this case,  H  0.17 and C  0.19 .
Whenever there exist multiple equilibria, the minimum level of monitoring 
required to ensure that neither agent cheats is C H. If monitoring was to 
be anywhere between those two cutoff points, contestants might still 
coordinate on the equilibrium in which both cheat. If multiple equilibria are 
not present, choosing   H is sufficient to prevent cheating. Note that
conditional on attaining an honest equilibrium, re-awarding comes at no cost.
When neither contestant cheats, the value of the prizes handed out is A  B,
independent of . It is worth mentioning at this point that this result can be
generalized to a continuous cheating decision. While the issue of multiple
equilibria may or may not be present when the decision to cheat is a
continuous one, an increase in cheating by one of the contestants would still
have the effect of reducing the expected penalty for the other. Thus cheating
decisions would still be strategic complements, and a greater degree of
monitoring would still be required.
2.4. THE EFFECTS OF RE-AWARDING
When prizes are re-awarded, there exists an additional means for a
competitor to win the first place prize. Now, an agent can win the first place
prize (assuming they are not found to have cheated) if the other contestant is
caught cheating. As noted above, re-awarding has no effect on an individual’s
incentive when the other contestant is not cheating, so H is independent of
. Let us then consider the effect of cheating on C. From above, if a
tournament organizer wishes to ensure an honest equilibrium, then she must
monitor with C if multiple equilibria are present.
First, note that re-awarding only affects a contestant when they do not win
the tournament. Thus, if players have a higher probability of winning the
tournament in a cheating equilibrium than when they deviate, after
accounting for adjustments in effort (i.e. Pẽ,eC, 0, 1  12 ), then
re-awarding has a greater impact on ẼU than on EUC. Re-awarding also
reduces the return to effort, since a player does not have to win the
tournament in order to get the first place prize. Of particular interest to
competitors is that their opponent decreases their effort ( ∂eC∂  0). Since the
outcome of a tournament matters to a contestant only when neither is
caught, this also tends to have a greater effect on ẼU than EUC. The exact
effect of  on C can be found by differentiating EUC− ẼU with respect to .
Proposition 2: The necessary and sufficient condition for ∂C∂  0 is
A − B  − 2 −
1
2  Pẽ,e
C, 0, 1 −
∂eC
∂ 1 − P2ẽ,e
C, 0, 1 − 1 − P2eC,eC, 1, 1  0.
A sufficient condition is that cheaters have a greater probability of winning the tournament
Pẽ,eC, 0, 1  12  and that the marginal return to 2’s effort is independent of 1’s
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behavior P2ẽ,eC, 0, 1  P2eC,eC, 1, 1.
Note that the latter part of this sufficient condition is restrictive. While it
describes the example of the linear Lazear-Rosen tournament above, it does
not apply to the Tullock example. However, it can be seen that, in both
cases, re-awarding reduces the amount of monitoring required.
Example 1 (Lazear-Rosen): In the linear example of a Lazear-Rosen tournament
above, it is optimal to re-award prizes with probability one.
Since P2ẽ,eC, 0, 1  P2eC,eC, 1, 1  P2 in this example, we have that ∂C∂
 A–B − 2 − − ∂eC∂ 1 −P2 0, where 0 is defined as above.
Example 2 (Tullock): In the Tullock example above, re-awarding decreases the
amount of monitoring required.
Using the values above (A  2, B  1 and   3), when prizes are re-awarded
with probability one, C  0.15. It is worth noting that, in both examples,
re-awarding actually eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibria, so that
the contestants need only be monitored with H.
The above result establishes a reason for prizes to be re-awarded. The next
section considers the effect that the prizes themselves have on the amount of
monitoring required.
3. WINNER TAKE ALL, ENTRY FEES AND OTHER
FEATURES
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Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Tullock (1980) both pointed out that effort is a 
function of the difference between the first-place and second-place prizes. In 
particular, it has been noted that winner-take-all formats induce maximal 
effort at the lowest cost. This stems from the first order conditions for effort, 
which depend on A − B. Consequently, there is no value to offering generous 
second prizes (or third and so on) in such a simple environment. However, in 
reality we often observe contests which do not adopt the winner-take-all 
approach; the Olympics with gold, silver and bronze medals is an obvious 
example. Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Singh and Wittman (2000), and 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) rationalized the existence of more than one 
prize by the incentives that the additional prizes create when participants are 
heterogeneous in their probability of winning a tournament. For example, in 
an 8-person race, if one contestant is heavily favored to win, the others will 
have more incentive to exert effort if there is a second-place prize. It should 
be noted that none of the above papers suggest that if there are N
contestants, then there should be N prizes. In this paper, there are two
symmetric risk neutral contestants, yet there still exists a rationale for a
second-place prize.
Consider an environment in which the equilibrium is unique (perhaps due
to re-awarding). Choosing a probability of detection equal to H is thus
sufficient to prevent cheating. Without limited liability, the incentive to cheat
would simply be an increasing function of A − B, for the same reasons that
effort increases in the difference between prizes. Tournaments would be
winner take all, and maximal fines or punishments would be imposed on
cheaters and contestants would be monitored as little as possible, as in the
standard Becker (1968) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) result. With limited
liability however, the expected punishment is the expected prize. Since effort
depends on A − B, if both A and B were to increase, but the difference
between them was unchanged, there would be no effect on effort. However,
the expected prize, and therefore the expected penalty, would increase. This
would enable the tournament organizer to decrease monitoring and still
obtain the non-cheating equilibrium, as demonstrated in the following Result.
Proposition 3: Increasing A and B such that A − B remains constant leads to the same
effort provided by both agents (in the equilibrium with no cheating), but reduces H.
Increasing both prizes is equivalent to increasing the sanction associated with
cheating. There is in effect something that can be taken away when bad
behavior is detected. Thus if monitoring is particularly costly, the organizer
may find it cheaper to offer larger prizes than to increase monitoring in order
to prevent contestant cheating. The same results can be derived for C.
If tournaments can charge entry fees, however, then it may actually end up
to be costless to reduce monitoring in this fashion. An entry fee would not
influence effort choices, nor would it affect the incentives to cheat, all else
equal. Such a fee, however, could be used to fund increases in both A and B.
That is, the entry fee acts as a bond that contestants post before the
tournament and do not get back if they are caught cheating. If the difference
between the two prizes were held the same, then efforts would be the same,
each agent’s expected payoff (net of the entry fee) would be the same, but
the organizer could spend less on monitoring costs.12
4. DIFFERENTIAL MONITORING
The analysis thus far has assumed that competitors must be monitored with
the same probability, . This need not be the case. For example, when prizes
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are not re-awarded, one could ensure a unique, honest equilibrium by setting
the level of monitoring for competitor 1 at H and for competitor 2 at C. If
this were done, 2 would not be willing to cheat no matter whether 1 were
cheating or not. Conversely, 1 would be willing to cheat if 2 were cheating,
but not if 2 is not cheating. Since 2 definitely will not cheat, 1 will also not
cheat. In this manner, the organizer could achieve the same equilibrium with
less total monitoring.13
A more common form of differential monitoring is to check for cheating
after the outcome of the tournament has been realized and to monitor the
winner to a greater degree than the loser. For example, urine tests are
mandatory for Olympic medal winners but occur only with some probability
for other athletes.14 By doing so, the monitoring exploits the fact that when
multiple equilibria are present, deterring one contestant from cheating helps
deter the other. However, this is not the only benefit of differential
monitoring. Since cheating increases one’s chances of winning, additional
monitoring of the winner has a greater impact on one’s decision to cheat. As
a result, the total amount of monitoring required can be reduced by
monitoring the winner more than the loser. This is true even when multiple
equilibria are not present. It should be noted that the second effect is similar
to the rank-based punishment strategy proposed by Berentsen (2002).
Let W and L denote the monitoring of the winner and loser of the
tournament, respectively. As in the last section, we only consider the case in
which H is sufficient to deter cheating so that if W  L  H, nobody
cheats. As before, when neither contestant cheats, their expected payoffs are
independent of any monitoring. The payoff when a contestant deviates,
however, is
1 − LB  Pê,eH, 1, 01 − WA − 1 − LB − cê
where ê is the optimal effort when deviating from an honest equilibrium. The
minimal amount of monitoring required to deter cheating is thus a variation
of equation 2.2:
A  B
2 − ceH  1−LB  Pê,eH, 1, 01−WA− 1−LB−cê.
Using the Implicit Function and Envelope Theorems, we find that
∂W
∂L  −
B
A 
1 − Pê,eH, 1, 0
Pê,eH, 1, 0  0.
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When ∂W∂L  −1, it is possible to increase the monitoring of the winner by
less than the decrease in the monitoring of the loser and still maintain an
equilibrium with no cheating.
Proposition 4: Suppose total detection costs are a function of the sum of the
probabilities with which each contestant is caught CW  L. Then total detection
costs can be reduced by monitoring the winner more than the loser if and only if
1 −Pê,eH, 1, 0B Pê,eH, 1, 0A. A sufficient condition is Pê,eH, 1, 0  12 ,
or that cheaters are more likely to win.
Thus there exists an efficiency explanation for the prevalence of
differential monitoring. There may, of course, be other reasons. If cheating
helps contestants win (net of the reduction in effort), then winners would
also be more likely to have cheated. Also, if it is for some reason important
that the winner be perceived to have not cheated, then differential
monitoring would help foster such perceptions. Note that this may be
particularly important for sports.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines different issues that arise when deterring tournament
participants from undertaking activities (which we refer to as “cheating”) that
increase their chances of winning, but that are undesirable. We consider a
standard detection and punishment scheme, but with a specific form of
limited liability that seems appropriate for most tournaments - contestants
can only have their prizes confiscated. In this case, the prize structure
becomes an important feature for deterrence. A main result centers on the
potential for multiple equilibria. We demonstrate that the tournament
environment creates an externality between competitors in their cheating
decisions, and so for a given enforcement effort, no cheating or both agents
cheating may both be equilibria. We focus on the minimum level of
enforcement that would deter cheating with probability one, and then look at
ways the prizes can be structured in order to reduce the monitoring intensity
and still achieve the same effort from the competitors.
An important feature of this paper is that it focuses on the equilibrium in
which no cheating takes place. In reality, it might be desirable to tradeoff
costs arising from cheating with prize and monitoring costs. To be properly
able to analyze such a problem, one would need a formal objective function
for a tournament organizer, something this paper did not undertake in order
to focus on the positive aspects of enforcement. Such a question would
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certainly be worthy of exploration. What would be the objective function of a 
tournament organizer be in this context?
In other models, the organizer is assumed to care about output which is a 
function of effort and a random component. If this is the sole objective, 
cheating would be undesirable if it displaces effort, or in the case of sabotage, 
destroys the productive efforts of others. Re-awarding, offering second-place 
prizes and differential monitoring all reduce efforts, but save on monitoring 
costs. However, is the displacement of effort the only cost to cheating?
Steroid use increases the speed of sprinters, the number of home runs hit or 
the top weight lifted, but can also have many negative effects. It can 
jeopardize contestants’ future heath, render comparisons of performance 
impossible (such as the comparison of Barry Bonds and Babe Ruth), or 
diminish interest in the competition. For example, a July 8, 2002 USA Today 
poll showed that 86% of baseball fans claim that compulsory testing for 
steroids would renew their interest in baseball. How these different costs 
enter the tournament organizer’s objective function would dictate the 
optimal levels of enforcement, effort, and cheating. We hope that this paper 
will stimulate research interest on these types of questions.
Finally, there exist some policy implications for the courts. We have thus 
far considered that the prizes, A and B, are determined by the tournament 
organizer. In many tournaments, however, the rewards to winning extend 
beyond any prize won directly. For example, in sports the tournament 
organizer may award medals or cash to the winners, but the benefits may 
extend to endorsement opportunities, increased future salary and prestige. 
While it is possible for the tournament organizer to re-award any medals or 
monetary prizes, it may not be possible to re-award these other benefits. That 
is, even if the tournament organizer strips a cheater of the first place prize 
and re-awards it to the runner-up, it may be the case that endorsement 
possibilities and prestige are diminished when a player wins via default, or 
simply because cheating is detected at a time when those outside benefits and 
opportunities are no longer available. Thus the tournament organizer may 
not be able to re-award the full benefits of winning, thereby reducing the 
deterrent effect of re-awarding. If contestants who were awarded a prize via 
re-awarding could receive the full benefits by suing cheaters, then the full 
deterrent effect would be restored. Thus there are implications of this 
analysis for the law of torts as well.
On February 15, 2008 Willie Gary, a former football player for the St. 
Louis Rams who was on the Super Bowl XXXVI losing team, filed a class 
action suit against the winning team, the New England Patriots. The case was
built on the suspicion that the New England Patriots gained an unfair
advantage by spying on the Rams’ pre-game practice. However, the National
Football League was not able to find any evidence of wrong-doing15 in its
own investigation, so on March 13, 2008 the case was dismissed.16 Of
interest to the analysis here, however is paragraph 52 of the complaint, filed
in the Eastern District of Louisiana:17
Each member of the St. Louis Rams 2002 Super Bowl Roster and staff
should be compensated for the monetary damages they suffer by losing
out on the receipt of (a) the winning bonus (For Super Bowl XXXVI, the
winning bonus was $58,000 vs. $33,000 for the loser. This is a $25,000
difference per player.) (b) a Super Bowl winner ring (a ring from Super
Bowl XXXVI is on eBay for $125,000), endorsements, and other
consequential economic losses.
In other words, the suit was asking for damages equal to the benefits that
could not be re-awarded. It is also interesting to note that it seems that a
necessary condition for such a suit to proceed is for the defendant(s) to have
been stripped of the prize by the tournament organizer. Since the NFL could
not find sufficient evidence that the Patriots had cheated, it was deemed that
there was insufficient evidence for the lawsuit. This is in stark contrast to a
civil suit arising from criminal actions, where a civil trial may be successful
even if the evidence was insufficient to garner a criminal conviction.
It is worth considering what would have been the optimal outcome of such
a court case, had there been enough evidence to demonstrate that the
Patriots had cheated. Surely, the NFL could have re-awarded the Super Bowl
to the Rams; it could also have imposed fines on the Patriots and paid the
$25,000 difference in bonuses to each of the Rams’ players. The NFL could
even have distributed new rings. However, the NFL has no control on the
value of those rings, nor does it have control over the endorsement
opportunities players get from being part of a Super Bowl winning team. If
the value of the rings as well as the endorsement opportunities are lessened
because of the cheating, then it would appear that there is a role for civil
suits. Given that we have shown that re-awarding is a useful tool in the
deterrence of cheating, allowing contestants to sue cheaters would help
ensure that there are more appropriate incentives within tournaments,
particularly in cases where the tournament organizer does not fully control
the benefits to winning.
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Appendix
Proof to Proposition 2: Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we have that
∂C
∂  −
∂EUC
∂ − ∂ẼU∂
∂EUC
∂ − ∂ẼU∂
Since the denominator is negative, the sign of ∂C∂ is the same as the sign of
the numerator. Thus ∂C∂  0 if and only if
∂EUC
∂ −
∂ẼU
∂  A − B  −

2 −
1
2  Pẽ,e
C, 0, 1 −
∂eC
∂ 1 − P2ẽ,e
C, 0, 1 − 1 − P2eC,eC, 1, 1  0.
Note that if cheaters have a greater probability of winning the tournament
even after accounting for changes in effort, Pẽ,eC, 0, 1  12 , then the first
term in the curly brackets is negative. If the marginal return to effort is
independent of the other’s behavior P2ẽ,eC, 0, 1  P2eC,eC, 1, 1, then
the second term (after the minus sign) is positive and the overall effect must
be negative. 
Proof to Proposition 3: The fact that effort remains the same in the
non-cheating equilibrium follows directly from the first order conditions. To
examine the effect on H, we note that if both A and B increase by the same
amount, the net effect is simply ∂H∂A  ∂H∂B .
∂H
∂A 
∂H
∂B  −
 12 −1−HP1, 0− ∂eH∂A c ′eH1−HP21, 0A−B
B  P1, 0A − B
− 1−
HP1, 0 12 − ∂eH∂B c ′eH−1−HP21, 0A−B
B  P1, 0A − B
From the first order conditions for effort choice, it can easily be shown
that ∂eH∂A  − ∂eH∂B . This implies that
∂H
∂A 
∂H
∂B 
−1  2 ∂eH∂A 1 − HP21, 0A − B
B  P1, 0A − B  0. 
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1. If there exist increasing returns, then the payoff to crime depends on the choices of others,
and multiple equilibria can be present. Increasing returns can be attributed to congestion
effects in deterrence as in Sah (1991), or due to social norms and stigma associated with
crime as described by Rasmusen (1996), or due to coordination issues surrounding
occupational choice as in Burdett et al. (2003) and Murphy et al. (1993).
2. See Preston and Szymanski (2003) for an extensive description of cheating in sports, and
Maenning (2003) for a focus on doping and corruption. Finally, Duggan and Levitt (2002)
look at voluntary losing in repeated sumo wrestling tournaments.
3. If criminals are risk neutral, it is the expected penalty that determines the level of deterrence.
Note that it may be optimal to have the expected penalty be finite, for reasons such as
marginal deterrence (see Friedman & Sjostrom, 1993; Mookherjee & Png, 1994; Stigler, 1970).
4. In a rather interesting example, Beckie Scott, a Canadian cross-country skier, initially won
the bronze medal at the 2002 Winter Olympics. After one of the Russian women ahead of
her tested positive for a banned substance, she was upgraded to silver. When the other
Russian woman tested positive as well, she (after a long legal battle) was awarded the gold,
marking the first time an athlete received the bronze, silver and gold in the same event.
This case is of interest, because the Olympic Committee debated for a long time whether
it was worthwhile to issue another gold medal. This paper suggests that it was.
5. The question as to why some activities are considered undesirable is an interesting one that
is left to further research.
6. If cheaters are subject to an additional penalty that is independent of rank in the contest
then all of our results still hold, just at lower levels of monitoring.
7. Since P is assumed to be symmetric, we have that P1eH , eH , 0, 0  −P2eH , eH , 0, 0,
and so the two first order conditions are identical.
8. One should note that when one contestant deviates, the effort level provided by the other
contestant remains unchanged. This is because we assume that both effort and cheating
decisions are simultaneous. This need not be the case; it is possible to imagine an
environment in which a players’s cheating decision is observable to the other contestant
before the choice of effort. This alternative environment yields qualitatively similar results.
9. We assume that, when indifferent between cheating and not, the player does not cheat.
10. While it may seem odd to cheat if it reduces the probability of winning, it may be
worthwhile because of the reduction in effort costs.
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11. Strictly speaking, since probabilities cannot be negative or greater than 1, this function
should be defined to take on the value of 0 when e1 − e2  1 − 2   0 and 1 when
e1 − e2  1 − 2   1.
12. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
13. We thank Peter Norman for this insight.
14. Note that this does not mean that medal winners are caught with probability one.
15. However, the 2007 Patriots were punished for a similar incident.
16. The history of the case can be followed at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-laedce/
case_no-2:2008cv01002/case_id-123943/. This website makes available the Eastern District of
Louisiana Complaint Class Action Jury Demand #08-1002, where information about the
case and the 2007 spying incident is available.
17. See Eastern District of Louisiana Complaint Class Action Jury Demand #08-1002, §52.
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